Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism

Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism

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  • Author:Quinn Slobodian
  • ISBN:0674244842
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Summary

George Louis Beer Prize Winner
Wallace K。 Ferguson Prize Finalist
A Marginal Revolution Book of the Year

"A groundbreaking contribution。。。Intellectual history at its best。"
--Stephen Wertheim, Foreign Affairs

Neoliberals hate the state。 Or do they? In the first intellectual history of neoliberal globalism, Quinn Slobodian follows a group of thinkers from the ashes of the Habsburg Empire to the creation of the World Trade Organization to show that neoliberalism emerged less to shrink government and abolish regulations than to redeploy them at a global level。 It was a project that changed the world, but was also undermined time and again by the relentless change and social injustice that accompanied it。

"Slobodian's lucidly written intellectual history traces the ideas of a group of Western thinkers who sought to create, against a backdrop of anarchy, globally applicable economic rules。 Their attempt, it turns out, succeeded all too well。"
--Pankaj Mishra, Bloomberg Opinion

"Fascinating, innovative。。。Slobodian has underlined the profound conservatism of the first generation of neoliberals and their fundamental hostility to democracy。"
--Adam Tooze, Dissent

"The definitive history of neoliberalism as a political project。"
--Boston Review

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Reviews

Nick

I learned a lot。

Justin

Dense at times, but is helping with my economic/political education

Erik Champenois

A helpful overview of the Geneva school of neoliberalism, with Mises, Hayek, and Röpke as some of the most prominent figures, and as distinguished from the (Milton Friedman) Chicago school of neoliberalism。 Slobodian shows how the Geneva neoliberals were not mere proponents of market fundamentalism in a shrinking state, but were instead focused on designing institutions to protect the market and ensure the free flow of capital in a globalized world。 The author also shows the deep suspicions towa A helpful overview of the Geneva school of neoliberalism, with Mises, Hayek, and Röpke as some of the most prominent figures, and as distinguished from the (Milton Friedman) Chicago school of neoliberalism。 Slobodian shows how the Geneva neoliberals were not mere proponents of market fundamentalism in a shrinking state, but were instead focused on designing institutions to protect the market and ensure the free flow of capital in a globalized world。 The author also shows the deep suspicions towards democracy held by neoliberals, who wished to design state and supranational institutions to safeguard the market against the masses, including protecting the market against redistributive policies, price adjustments, etc。 Neoliberalism has been at least partly successful in the establishment of the World Trade Organization and other international institutions protecting trade and investment worldwide。 This is the kind of intellectual history that is best read in companionship with other books, as the book deals with the 1920s-1970s and doesn't cover the full scope of neoliberal intellectual thought and history - there's only minor treatment or reference to the Reagan-Thatcher era, the seemingly successful decade of globalization in the 1990s, and the crisis of globalization resulting from the 2007-2010 financial crises and later elections of Trump and Brexit。 "Neoliberalism" is often used as a catchall phrase, especially on the political left, without there being more of a detailed analysis of what exactly neoliberalism is, what exactly is bad or good about neoliberalism, and what alternatives to neoliberalism there are。 I read this book in part to engage these deeper questions and while the book provided me with more background information I will need to find more books to engage my questions more thoroughly。 。。。more

Joshua Rosen

Hayek thought that the global marketplace was an unknowable God, and that any attempt at studying it would destroy it。 In other words, he was afraid of math, and the use of math for any kind of national planning was his version of hell。 In his mind, social safety nets and unions, corporate taxes and reparations to the Global South were tantamount to serfdom, enslaving the free movement of capital to the whims of democracy and social justice。 Lack of food and housing and jobs and healthcare were Hayek thought that the global marketplace was an unknowable God, and that any attempt at studying it would destroy it。 In other words, he was afraid of math, and the use of math for any kind of national planning was his version of hell。 In his mind, social safety nets and unions, corporate taxes and reparations to the Global South were tantamount to serfdom, enslaving the free movement of capital to the whims of democracy and social justice。 Lack of food and housing and jobs and healthcare were unfortunate but necessary sacrifices for the efficient flow of capital。Along with segregationist William Buckley and apartheid-defender Wilhelm Ropke, Hayek received the presidential medal of freedom from H。W。 in 1991。 Their shitty books and speculative essays and garbage rhetoric quite literally built the international economic order of the world today。 It’s good to know that。 This book does of good job of showing how, and why。 。。。more

Jonathon

Dry dry dry。 Flashes of intense interest on my part (South Africa and Rhodesia chapters, human rights chapter, discussing the Hapsburg legacy at the beginning, the Seattle discussion at the end), but overall, it’s not my favored subject area, and so I was glazed over for periods。

William Wallo

This is an excellent companion read to “The Great Transformation”。 Polanyi follows the spread of liberal ideology and the development of the market society from the late-18th century to the mid-20th century, and Slobodian traces the origins of neoliberalism from its beginnings post-WWI through the creation of the WTO in 1995。 Incredibly well-researched, this book thoroughly articulated the different strains in neoliberal thought throughout the past 80 years, highlighting differences in theory/id This is an excellent companion read to “The Great Transformation”。 Polanyi follows the spread of liberal ideology and the development of the market society from the late-18th century to the mid-20th century, and Slobodian traces the origins of neoliberalism from its beginnings post-WWI through the creation of the WTO in 1995。 Incredibly well-researched, this book thoroughly articulated the different strains in neoliberal thought throughout the past 80 years, highlighting differences in theory/ideology that often get lost by other writers on the left when critiquing neoliberalism more broadly-speaking。 I highly recommend this to anyone interested in understanding institutions and institutional theory, learning more about recent economic history, and people trying to make sense of the global economic debates that continue to persist today。 。。。more

Matthew Alampay Davis

A history of neoliberalism that forgoes the typical discussion of Reagan, Thatcher, Pinochet, and structural adjustment programs and instead finds its intellectual roots in racist sociopaths getting big mad about decolonization。 Rigorously researched and argued, points off for exceeding dryness and density。

Olan McEvoy

Slobodian’s history of the ‘Geneva School’ of neoliberalism is a pathbreaking work。 Despite being a work of history focusing on the period from 1920s to the 1980s and certain academics, businessmen and politicians, it provides a new way to understand the rise of international economic institutions such as the WTO and the European institutions。 Slobodian is part of a wider group of scholars (including Phillip Mirowski and others) who have rejected the idea of neoliberalism as “market fundamentali Slobodian’s history of the ‘Geneva School’ of neoliberalism is a pathbreaking work。 Despite being a work of history focusing on the period from 1920s to the 1980s and certain academics, businessmen and politicians, it provides a new way to understand the rise of international economic institutions such as the WTO and the European institutions。 Slobodian is part of a wider group of scholars (including Phillip Mirowski and others) who have rejected the idea of neoliberalism as “market fundamentalism” or largely as a theoretical project。 Instead they see Neoliberalism an active political project spanning from the early 1920s to today which wants to “encase” the market away from the pressures of democratic mass society。 Slobodian’s novel contribution to the literature with this book is his focus on the effects of the decline of empire on the movement - first the Habsburg and later the British and French。 The effects of decolonisation on the thoughts of these actors is essential to understand their process in shaping many of the international institutions we still deal with today。 The book largely on German-speaking economists and lawyers, although Lionel Robbins and to an extent Milton Friedman also feature。 The works of von Mises, Hayek, Röpke, Haberler and Petersmann are focused on in some depth with other important thinkers brought in along the way。 While this could seem like an intellectual history of the classic sort, Slobodian is focused on their roles in the development of organisations and networks such as the International Chamber of Commerce, the Mont Pelerín Society and Trade Policy Research Centre which had meaningful impact on the development of larger international economic institutions。 Slobodian’s history is essential to an understanding of our current institutions which in often cases ‘encase’ the market from democratic interference, prioritise the sanctity of international property law and see ‘undisturbed’ price signals as the ends of all economic activity。 Highlighting the legal focus of this movement, which in many cases after the Second World War ignored strictly economic issues and was led by lawyers, is interesting and shows how the development of international economic law may in fact be the biggest lasting legacy of the neoliberals。 I’d recommend this book to anyone who wants to understand what neoliberalism is and how it has shaped our current situation。 Slobodian writes clearly and in an enjoyable style, which never makes any of the content unnecessarily heavy to endure。 Other books which would complement this for additional would be Andrew Gamble’s The Free Economy and The Strong State, and Philip Mirowski’s Never Let a Serious Crisis go to Waste。 。。。more

Colin Kiser

Slobidian finds a way to fairly and interestingly weave a history of rather drab individual events and writings into a cohesive and persuasive narrative that many neoliberals themselves would struggle to count as uncharitable or blatant misrepresentation。 Relying on vast quotation and source material, ‘Globalists’ puts forth the propositions and architecture of neoliberals with light commentary。 Only in his conclusion does Slobodian turn slightly polemic。As someone who grew up with the implicit Slobidian finds a way to fairly and interestingly weave a history of rather drab individual events and writings into a cohesive and persuasive narrative that many neoliberals themselves would struggle to count as uncharitable or blatant misrepresentation。 Relying on vast quotation and source material, ‘Globalists’ puts forth the propositions and architecture of neoliberals with light commentary。 Only in his conclusion does Slobodian turn slightly polemic。As someone who grew up with the implicit understand of free market fundamentalism as a God-given gift to humanity, this has been a massive shift in my understanding of our economic reality as designed, not organically grown。 For anyone wanting to understand or find an economic path forward, we must understand our past。 Start here。 。。。more

Rob Wilson

This is one of the best books I've read this year and might even be the best。 It's accessible, informative, and interesting。 I'd recommend it to anyone with an interest in politics, law, philosophy, or economics。 This is one of the best books I've read this year and might even be the best。 It's accessible, informative, and interesting。 I'd recommend it to anyone with an interest in politics, law, philosophy, or economics。 。。。more

jt

Excellent history of early neoliberalism。 Provides an almost materialist history of the whos and whys and hows of Hayek, Mises, Ropke, and the MPS。 Something obviously needed to happen after the collapse of European empire, and those folks offered a solution。 Slobodian deftly tells the tale and exposes certain contradictions。

Grant

It's dense, well researched and highly informative history of the formation of neoliberal ideology。 It's dense, well researched and highly informative history of the formation of neoliberal ideology。 。。。more

David Sogge

This compelling, careful work of intellectual history makes a deep dive into the origins of the most powerful political ideas at play in recent times。 The problem is, they are seriously bad ideas。 Roughly speaking, they seek to sideline democracy with its tendencies to respond to citizen needs through public welfare and other kinds of ‘downward’ redistribution。 (Meanwhile ‘upward’ redistribution is quietly welcomed。) These ideas spurn national developmental ambitions, especially those promoted w This compelling, careful work of intellectual history makes a deep dive into the origins of the most powerful political ideas at play in recent times。 The problem is, they are seriously bad ideas。 Roughly speaking, they seek to sideline democracy with its tendencies to respond to citizen needs through public welfare and other kinds of ‘downward’ redistribution。 (Meanwhile ‘upward’ redistribution is quietly welcomed。) These ideas spurn national developmental ambitions, especially those promoted with plans。 Instead they favour supranational governance with strong, binding laws meant to protect private interests。 That is, governance that can neutralize political life of nation-states and their obligations to citizens。 Such ideas downplay data and quantitative targets as topics of public debate and policy-making。 Instead, they favour non-transparent, go-with-the-flow, de-politicised economic statecraft。 Yet when it comes to investments, commerce and the protection of wealth, the rules must be rigorous, binding, and wholly beyond the reach of public politics。 All in the name of "freedom"。 Sound familiar? These notions are, after all, the conceptual building-blocks of today’s globalized capitalism and its defense forces in corporate law, politically 'independent' central banks, international tax competition and tax havenry, the World Trade Organisation, the European Union and so forth。 Before reading this book I thought I was reasonably well informed about the taproots of neoliberalism, the Mont Pelerin Society and kindred policy lobby networks。 But I was mistaken。 This book gave me a comeuppance, and a welcome one at that。 Thanks to Slobodian’s Globalists, the foundations of today’s corporate-friendly discourse and legal architecture, as revealed in Pistor’s The Code of Capital (see my ***** review here in Goodreads) have been exposed for all to see。 。。。more

Daniel

Well done Slobodian for actually reading and engaging with the authors on the other side of the political divide。 Nothing is particularly revolutionary if you've done the same, buts its a nice collection of essays driving home a good point-functioning markets don't exist in anarchy, national governments can't be trusted to enforce property rights, property rights could perhaps be protected by the democratic bubble international orgs exist in。 Well done Slobodian for actually reading and engaging with the authors on the other side of the political divide。 Nothing is particularly revolutionary if you've done the same, buts its a nice collection of essays driving home a good point-functioning markets don't exist in anarchy, national governments can't be trusted to enforce property rights, property rights could perhaps be protected by the democratic bubble international orgs exist in。 。。。more

Adam

Political discourse online has, many people agree, made a night incomprehensible hash of whatever the word 'neoliberalism' might have once meant。 I remember hearing of it as a term associated with economic imperialism back in my anarchist days, then came to see it as essentially synonymous with technocratic market progressivism on Twitter。 For a while there, before socdem and neoliberal twitter schismed, it seemed like neoliberal was a reasonable term for the outlook I had gravitated toward afte Political discourse online has, many people agree, made a night incomprehensible hash of whatever the word 'neoliberalism' might have once meant。 I remember hearing of it as a term associated with economic imperialism back in my anarchist days, then came to see it as essentially synonymous with technocratic market progressivism on Twitter。 For a while there, before socdem and neoliberal twitter schismed, it seemed like neoliberal was a reasonable term for the outlook I had gravitated toward after leaving anti-civism, listening to a lot of Econtalk and feeling convinced by some of it but not totally on board with the Libertarian anti-progressivism Russ leans to。 On top of that, though, there was Hayek: making points I found compelling and ahead of their time on one hand but fairly credibly condemned as a dictator-lover by more orthodox socialists。 What this book makes very clear is that I had just not done my homework on any of this stuff。 It certainly validates my decision to never go so far as to actually call myself a neoliberal。 The ideological history here is in many ways much more straightforward than I thought。 Hayek wasn't a laissez faire libertarian as opposed to intervention-friendly neoliberals。 He was a self-identitied neoliberal himself, and he and his colleagues took the term to refer to an ideology that suggested exactly the international institutions modern anti-capitalists smear with the term。 I'm glad to have all of that clarified。 Beyond that, though, I was a bit frustrated by what the book had to offer。 The content is loaded with historical minutiae--which scholars met at which conferences in which cities in which years, who corresponded with who about what, what positions they took on which trade deals and international institutions, etc--but it doesn't add up to much。 Slobodian makes his thesis clear throughout: that neoliberalism isn't a laissez-faire ideology but one concerned with establishing a clear and uniform legal context for the global market。 That matches the broad strokes idea of the modern neoliberal twitter ppl as markets harnessed and bounded by smart intervention, except that the subjects of the book meant it far more specifically--eg to exclude Keynesian economic policy as well as mercantilism and Marxism。 The problem is that the exposition of this thesis is extremely superficial in all the ways one might hope an intellectual history should be deep。 Slobodian frames it in terms that would with absolute certainty read as explicitly derogatory to anyone coming in with even the slightest bit of anti-capitalist bent, and fairly suspicious to anyone who isn't already friendly to Hayek。 As he puts it, neoliberalism is about creating legal frameworks to "protect capitalism from democracy。" Elsewhere he goes further。 Neoliberals wanted to create "human rights for capital" that would protect investors from nationalization and certain kinds of regulation。 And he quotes them saying these things in their own words! Hard to deny he's being accurate here。 But it's not entirely clear that he's being fair, because he doesn't give their ideas a hearing at all。 Slobodian never bothers to even try to explain why Hayek and his colleagues might have thought such things。 He simply allows them to find support for their negative biases--von Mises worked as an overt advocate for big business, Hayek had a special dislike for unions, Rubka(sp?) supported apartheid, etc。 Their idea was as bad as it sounds a face value because they had bad motivations。The problem with this approach is not that Slobodian is wrong, but that for readers like me, who have a charitable reading of Hayek at least in mind that makes the superficial shock of "protecting capitalism from democracy" a lot less shocking and a lot more consistent with progressive principles, there's almost nothing here to inform me as to why and even often to what extent actual neoliberal belief and policy differed from this left-libertarian cousin。 I often got the sense that Slobodian wanted us to think neoliberalism was working exactly as intended, because it wasn't a credible and well meaning ideology subverted by business interests so much as a crock of shit made up to justify those interests in the first place。 Slobodian never really discusses at all why any of these thinkers thought these policies were a good idea, what their motivations were, whether they were pleased by the results their policies got when enacted, or anything that would allow us to actually judge neoliberalism per se against the flawed reality。 You might argue that that's not the point of a book like this, but aside from the fact that it does give a very unsupported negative impression on the question, I just think that that is wrong。 By contrast, for instance, Paul Sabin's book The Bet is an intellectual history that goes very far to explore actual context, motivation, results, etc, and that's the sort of thing I'd like to have gotten here。 I would have quite liked to come away from this book with a better understanding of why Hayek found labor unions so much more of a threat to his ideals than they seem to be to me, especially relative to more obvious threats like corporate lobbying。 But that question just doesn't seem very obvious here because it never seems like the neoliberals held principles that might have threatened corporate interests in the first place。 And since they certainly did, it's hard to see how that doesn't make Slobodian's portrayal feel misleading。 。。。more

Gonzalo Escribano

An absolute gem, Globalists by Quinn Slobodian shows how a category that is usually abused in politics can actually be used in an intelligent and honest way。 Slobodian's account is incredibly well researched and escapes all commonplaces about neoliberalism that for example tend to put people like Friedman and Hayek in the same box。 Slobodian is both critical and fair。 His intention in this book is to further a proposal that there is a distinct tradition of neoliberals that starts in Vienna and b An absolute gem, Globalists by Quinn Slobodian shows how a category that is usually abused in politics can actually be used in an intelligent and honest way。 Slobodian's account is incredibly well researched and escapes all commonplaces about neoliberalism that for example tend to put people like Friedman and Hayek in the same box。 Slobodian is both critical and fair。 His intention in this book is to further a proposal that there is a distinct tradition of neoliberals that starts in Vienna and becomes later the "Geneva school"。 Their focus is not on the science of economics, it is actually a much more legalistic and philosophical proposal, better described by Hayek's "complex adaptive system"。 What markets need are legal and institutional structures to guard them from the pressures that arise from an unequal distribution of wealth and democratic demands。 Slobodian's genius lies in the way in which he traces back a history of neoliberals and the way in which they have politically sought to build those institutions and international legal frameworks from the League of Nations to the World Trade Organization。 The book is rather robust and for someone who came about it without an academic objective in mind, it sometimes requires some re-reading but believe me, it is worth the effort。 。。。more

Salvatore Genuensis

This review seeks to articulate my reading of Globalists by Slobodian。 The book thoroughly examines the intellectual legacy of a group of neoliberal scholars and their impact on globalization。 I would have preferred seeing Geneva as an international network hub during the interwar period。 The problem with identifying a heterogeneous group as a school is problematic, but Slobodian recognizes that in his introduction。 His narrative focuses on a group of thinkers that shaped post-war institutions。 This review seeks to articulate my reading of Globalists by Slobodian。 The book thoroughly examines the intellectual legacy of a group of neoliberal scholars and their impact on globalization。 I would have preferred seeing Geneva as an international network hub during the interwar period。 The problem with identifying a heterogeneous group as a school is problematic, but Slobodian recognizes that in his introduction。 His narrative focuses on a group of thinkers that shaped post-war institutions。 Positive remarks:Speaking of which, early in the book captures my attention by taking the reader back in time to Vienna’s Ringstrasse。 In Slobodian’s interpretation, back in the day, Vienna’s Ringstrasse represented a symbol of a modern city and its vision of social order。 Here, according to him, is neoliberalism's birthplace。 Generally, it should not be left unmentioned that Vienna of the 1920s must have been a stimulating city for the intellectually-minded。 As ‘The Economist’ wrote in 2016 that “The sceptics were right。 Imperial Viennese society could not survive。 But the ideas and art brought forth during the fecund period of Viennese history from the late 1880s to the 1920s endured”。 The Habsburg Empire did not survive and Austria once a great power became the opposite, a small nation。 This shift from Empire to a small nation must have had a big impact on the Austrian scholars。 But for the neoliberals of that period, the interwar period was a difficult period。 Milton’s quote from “Samson Agonistes” can capture their sentiment perfectly: “But what more oft in nations grown corrupt, and by their vices brought to servitude, than to love bondage more than liberty – bondage with ease than strenuous liberty”。 This sentiment is captured and described well by Slobodian, how this unstable period shaped their views。 Slobodian rightly points out, that the economism of which neoliberals are often accused, is simply not true。 At the very heart of neoliberals is as he puts it of statecraft and law。 With reference to Foucault, neoliberals are legal interventionists。 Here I want to point out those institutional safeguards and legal constraints to prevent what happened with the collapse of the Empire and the protectionist wave of the interwar period。 That may have an impression of thwarting democracy, but one core element is the rule of law (Herrschaft des Rechts) and equity before the law, and not arbitrary legalism。 Slobodian has succeeded in placing the aspects of law as an integral part of a neoliberal governance structure。 Slobodian (2018: 18) writes that “The essence of this project was multitiered governance or neoliberal federalism。 In the wake of the mystification of the world economy, the Geneva School neoliberal’s most important field of influence was not in economics per se but in international law and international governance”。 In a similar vein, Slobodian (2018: 240) notes that “In 1979, in a section calling for “the dethronement of politics,” Hayek wrote, “In this century our attempts to create an international government capable of assuring peace have generally approached the task from the wrong end: creating large numbers of specialized authorities aiming at particular regulations rather than aiming at a true international law which would limit the powers of national governments to harm each other”。 Also, he succeeds in describing the neoliberals as a heterogeneous group of thinkers, distinguishes them as universalists and constitutionalists (p。 183)。Critical remarks:As much as I find Slobodian’s book a stimulating read, there is one issue that I have to mention。 Slobodian gave numerous talks about this book。 One of those was the book presentation that he gave at the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs。 There he used a term speaking of “constitutional fetishism” which I found rather odd。 In the book, he refers to as institutional encasement (p。 13)。 First, the main critique I have is that while he outlined in his introduction this particular term, he did not include his notion of a constitutional design。 He, as a historian, should have outlined his own position and placed it in the introduction, regardless of a lack of space。 Hence, Slobodian leaves the reader alone where he stands。 While his position is against institutional encasement; his position is clear but subtle, arguing that it thwarts the democratic processes in favor of their goals such as property rights, capital mobility, and global free trade。 I do understand that some of the highly specialized multinational institutions seem opaque to many of us。 What is his alternative? Which concept of democratic participation he has in mind? What is his take on multi-level governance? What I miss is a serious treatment of constitutional theory in general and compared to neoliberal constitutional thought。 Constitutional constraints exist to limit the abuse of power under which evil men can do the least harm。 Yet, constitutions are man-made institutions that are far from perfect。 One example that I can think of, is voting rights, which has been contested throughout US history, and this is one of the oldest democracies。 The discontent with supranational governance, globalization, and trade policies has led to political disruptions。 On both sides of the Atlantic the rise of demagogues, Brexit, and the anti-trade rhetoric of Trump has changed the post-World war II order for good。 Hence, Globalism is on the defensive, and very few timidly defend the gains from freer trade。 But, of course, globalization has produced both winners and losers。 On the one hand, the hockey stick of human prosperity of the past two hundred years has lifted ordinary people from dire conditions (see McCloskey 2016)。 On the other hand, the elephant graph is a result of the third wave of globalization, the winners have been the poor and middle classes in Asia (mostly China and India), and losers the lower middle class of the rich world (see Milanovic 2016)。 This particular point I just briefly sketched, I have missed at least as a side note in his book。 Most importantly, Slobodian does not hide his left-leaning political stance, but throughout the book, I found subtle ideological driven misrepresentation that I must call the “malevolence assumption”。 The Geneva network did not have a monopoly within the broader debate。 Why? First, is it for Slobodian so hard to accept that even neoliberals are thinking hard about how to achieve progress and the common good? I think both left-leaning and liberal-leaning (in the European sense) stance suggest progress and the common good, only the means to that end differ。 Second, what about the influence of Keynes in being a key player of post-war institution building? These are the main criticisms that I have。Additional thoughts related to the book:Neoliberals recognize that human beings are far from perfect, we make mistakes, are flawed, we err, and we commit consciously and repeated mistakes。 And, of course, this makes markets imperfect as well as all of our man-made institutions。 The fear of markets (emporiophobia) is not a good counselor for finding answers to social and economic problems but often stem from institutional deficiencies of a politico-economic framework。 The “rules of the game” are crucial institutional preconditions for a social and economic order that is conducive to the commonweal。 That is why neoliberals as described in this book, are so eager about thinking in orders。 Thinking in orders may sound odd because it suggests orderliness that you’d expect from the German-speaking world。 The end of the empire and the interwar period was in for the individual scholars of the Geneva network a decisive event。 Neoliberals thought long and hard about smart rules for a robust political economy and how a competitive order should look like。 Think of it in terms of a three-legged bar-stool that represents: 1) economic institutions, 2) political/legal institutions, and 3) social/cultural institutions (Boettke 2001: 5)。 The book has also shown how world history and their events have an impact on individuals, which is not surprising。 Considering this, the fall of the iron curtain, the financial crises of 2007-2009, and the pandemic of COVID-19 had a significant impact。 In sum, I highly recommend this book regardless of political leaning。 Slobodian’s book provides a stimulating read and contributes to the history of ideas in general and neoliberalism in particular。 This book might be capable of promoting an inter-ideological conversation among moderates。 Despite the strength of a novel approach and shortcomings in the historical facts, by and large, Slobodian is a fair idea trader, and his book deserves a four-star rating。Academic book reviews as additional reading:Kolev, S。 (2019)。 Yet Another Neoliberal School? Geneva and Its Ordoglobalists。 ORDO, 2018(69), 523-528。 Roessler, F。 (2019)。 BOOK REVIEW: Democracy, Redistribution and the WTO: A Comment on Quinn Slobodian's book Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism Harvard University Press, 2018。 World Trade Review, 18(2), 353-359。 Stöcker, L。 F。 (2019)。 Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism。 By Quinn Slobodian。 Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018。 Pp。 400。 Cloth $35。00。 ISBN 978-0674979529。 Central European History, 52(2), 374-376。 。。。more

Ryan

These guys were so gd smart man

Adora

Pretty gripping intellectual history illustrating the underpinnings of neoliberal thought; Slobodian challenges dominant narratives of neoliberalism as being somehow positioned against rules/institutions, pointing out that Hayek and others envisioned a world with a lot of rules - just ones that enabled the free(r) passage of capital。 Though some readers may find it easy to detach judgment I found it difficult not to react to feel a little incensed at some of the Geneva School's preeminent cast o Pretty gripping intellectual history illustrating the underpinnings of neoliberal thought; Slobodian challenges dominant narratives of neoliberalism as being somehow positioned against rules/institutions, pointing out that Hayek and others envisioned a world with a lot of rules - just ones that enabled the free(r) passage of capital。 Though some readers may find it easy to detach judgment I found it difficult not to react to feel a little incensed at some of the Geneva School's preeminent cast of characters。 Like Ludwig von Mises, who saw nothing wrong with the violent police reaction to a work stoppage by Social Democrats in Vienna in July 1927 (cops "killed protestors with rifles in the center of the city, and then drove out to workers' housing complexes in the suburbs and killed more。 After three days, eighty-nine people were dead and over a thousand injured。 The workers' movement was permanently crippled。") Slobodian goes on to write, "The right to kill with impunity under emergency powers met Mises's approval。" Because anything goes to protect your beloved ~free economic exchange ~! (At what point, one wonders, does the pile of bodies become high enough to outweigh your desire for unhindered price signaling?) Oh and then there's Wilhelm Röpke, who vocally supported apartheid in South Africa, and for whom white supremacy was an "essential feature of the extra-economic framework securing the world economy" (ended up being bedfellows with the ascendant American right, no surprise there)。 After these dudes Hayek sounded positively woke by comparison。 Ultimately the title of the book's final chapter, "A World of People without a People," sums up the utopia envisioned by these figures: a world economy that transcends projects of social justice and democratic governance in nation-states -- the market only then freed to fulfill its unknowable and sublime potential。 (And if you have to back some dictators to get there, nbd!) >:( 。。。more

Timothy Dymond

“Against Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms — of speech, of worship, from fear, from want — neoliberals posed the four freedoms of capital, goods, services, and labor。”The empire in Quinn Slobodian’s ‘Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism’ is the almost forgotten but tremendously consequential Austro-Hungarian Empire。 Ruled over by the House of Habsburg, the ‘Dual Monarchy’ was the great power in Central Europe between 1867 and 1918。 Geographically it was the second-largest territo “Against Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms — of speech, of worship, from fear, from want — neoliberals posed the four freedoms of capital, goods, services, and labor。”The empire in Quinn Slobodian’s ‘Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism’ is the almost forgotten but tremendously consequential Austro-Hungarian Empire。 Ruled over by the House of Habsburg, the ‘Dual Monarchy’ was the great power in Central Europe between 1867 and 1918。 Geographically it was the second-largest territory, and ethnically and religiously it was extremely diverse。 The Empire’s official languages were German, Hungarian, and Croatian-Slavonian, but it also ruled over Bosnian, Czech, Romani, Romanian, Rusyn, Ruthenian, Serbian, Slovak, Slovene, and Yiddish speakers。For many years before its defeat and dissolution, the Austro-Hungarian Empire was a declining anachronism in an era of rising nationalism and democratic political demands。 The empire’s ethnicities and religions were notionally united by their loyalty to a Royal House rather than a nation — a House represented in its latter days by the Emperor Franz Joseph I。 The inner weaknesses of the Empire were amply demonstrated by its defeats and subordination to German War Plans during the First World War。 It collapsed in 1918 after the Western allies, particularly US President Woodrow Wilson, declared that Austria-Hungary would not survive in the new era of national self-determination in Europe。Slobodian argues that one of Austria-Hungary’s surprising legacies has been neoliberalism。 While many associate that term with a set of economic beliefs about virtues of free-market capitalism, Slobodian argues that it is better seen as a ‘project of politics and law’ emerging from Central Europe in the wake of the empire’s collapse。 Full review at: https://medium。com/@timothyjamesdymon。。。 。。。more

Josh Friedlander

Before hearing Quinn Slobodian (in this 2018 podcast) on the topic, I'd decided that neoliberalism - despite the ubiquity of the term - could be dismissed by a useful intellectual history rule I have: in any "neo-x" (sometimes "x revival"), you can just ignore the prefix (or suffix); the differences are invariably historical but not substantial。 So critics of neoliberalism are critics of liberalism - an important debate, sure, but old-hat。 This learned, fascinating book is full of interesting de Before hearing Quinn Slobodian (in this 2018 podcast) on the topic, I'd decided that neoliberalism - despite the ubiquity of the term - could be dismissed by a useful intellectual history rule I have: in any "neo-x" (sometimes "x revival"), you can just ignore the prefix (or suffix); the differences are invariably historical but not substantial。 So critics of neoliberalism are critics of liberalism - an important debate, sure, but old-hat。 This learned, fascinating book is full of interesting details (more in a bit), but since I found the definition of neoliberalism a bit slippery, I will put it here (in my understanding) for the impatient:1) Historically neoliberalism was a response to the shocks of the entre-deux-guerres in Central Europe, and the Keynesian moment。 Neoliberal thinkers differ from classical liberals most markedly in their desire for state structures (an order) to protect the security and stability of the market from the populist pressures of special interest groups。 Far from trying to "unfetter" markets, they wish to strengthen the legal structures in which those markets operate against democratic pressures。2) In recent times, the book focuses on the global application of those principles, via international institutions such as the World Trade Organisation。 Just as neoliberals seek to circumvent democratic pressures on a national level by enshrining commercial freedom in law, the international neoliberal institutions seek to replicate the dominating force of empire to protect trade in a world of selfish, unruly nationalism。The origins of neoliberalism aren't hard to trace back to the Walter Lippmann Colloquium in 1938, where both neoliberalism and ordoliberalism began。 From Slobodian's book it seems that the two are largely synonymous: English Wikipedia stresses their differences Ordoliberals promoted the concept of the social market economy, and this concept promotes a strong role for the state with respect to the market, which is in many ways different from the ideas connected to the term neoliberalism。 Oddly the term neoliberalism was originally coined by ordoliberal Alexander Rüstow。but the German language one disagrees Der Ordoliberalismus gehört zu einer heterogenen wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Strömung, die unter dem Oberbegriff Neoliberalismus zusammengefasst wird。。。Die Begriffe Ordoliberalismus und Neoliberalismus werden in der Literatur teilweise aber auch synonym verwendet。 My understanding is that leftist critics of liberalism have tended to indiscriminately label all free-market liberals as neoliberals (Thatcher, Reagan, Milton Friedman。。。), but see ordoliberals as different; however in truth the differences between ordo- and neoliberals are nugatory compared to their mutual distance from standard liberalism。 Slobodian at least chooses to focus on the subgenre of neoliberal most similar to ordoliberals, that of what he terms (parallel to the "Freiburg School" of ordoliberalism) the "Geneva School"。 (Globalist cosmopolitanism, of course, is very Swiss。)Geneva Schoolers such as Friedrich Hayek and Ludwig von Mises were involved early on in the collection of statistics on the global economy。 (Both attended a 1936 conference to discuss the question "Does the global economy exist?") One of the interesting ideas in the book is that Hayek tended to answer negatively: that the economy was so complex, almost mystical, that no attempts to map or plan it would succeed, contra both Keynesians and socialists。 He sometimes borrowed the language of cybernetics (describing prices as a "feedback effect")。 Evidence of this (to me) is that highly educated people will argue passionately as to whether Keynesian stimulus is effective, implying that this cannot be definitively answered by empirical means。Thus the term "ordoglobalism"。 Order, noted Jan Tumlir (a senior wonk at the WTO predecessor, GATT, and a major figure in the book) can have two meanings: stability, in the sense of "law and order"; and the rules and institutions which create it。 Freiburg School ordoliberals saw chaos in postwar Vienna, and sought to use "nomocracy", rule by law, to protect the social order from the demands of the masses。 Likewise, as empires crumbled and postcolonial states stepped up to demand more privileges, the Geneva School "ordoglobalists" sought to utilise international law and institutions to curtail that disruption。 In Tumlir's words: “International rules protect the world market against governments。”Early on the book cites a useful distinction made by the Nazi jurist Carl Schmitt, based in Roman law, between empirium (government) and dominium (private property)。 Schmitt thought it desirable to strengthen the former world at the expense of the latter, but the Geneva School believed the oppposite。 Most of them were Austrians who remembered warmly the advantages of the Dual Monarchy, and saw it as a model to try and reproduce。 In the words of Röpke (discussed below), they werethe generation which in its youth saw the sunset glow of that long and glorious sunny day of the western world, which lasted from the Congress of Vienna until August 1914, and of which those who have only lived in the present arctic night of history can have no adequate conception。Chapter Five focuses mostly on Wilhelm Röpke, a heterodox neoliberal (he quit the neoliberal Mont Pelerin society after disagreements with Hayek) who was a notable defender of South African apartheid。 However, Hayek and Milton Friedman were also skeptical about boycotts of the regime, emphasising neoliberalism's priority of markets over human rights。 (This is basically Friedman's only appearance in the book, adding to the confusion of the term "neoliberal"。) Another example is the way the Geneva School supported freedom of movement for capital, but not for people。 In the words of Gottfried von Haberler:The Ruhr Valley would become unbelievably crowded, and the Alps would empty out entirely。。。One need not be a nationalist for such things to be undesirable。。。free trade is beneficial for all even when there is no freedom of migration and the peoples remain firmly rooted in their countries。Slobodian relates how the founding of the European Economic Community, far from being a boon to ordoglobalists, actually worried them。 A colonial bloc spanning from "the Baltic to the Congo" meant simply a vast space of imperial protectionism, a trading bloc that would disrupt the natural flow of capital in and out of its borders (while liberating it internally)。 (In Schmitt's terminology, it was empirium, not dominium, which perhaps can be said of its successor European Union。) In fact some European rearguard defenders of colonialism projected a potential Eurafrique trading zone - but it was not to be。 Decolonisation meant a potentially destabilising wave of countries leaving the framework of empire and allowing the particular interests of their populations to threaten global trade。 It was in global institutions that neoliberal ideas would now come to expression。It is a curious fact that while Slobodian's politics are rooted in left opposition to trade treaties and globalisation, the standard-bearers of anti-globalist nationalism are now on the right, the most prominent of whom is in the Oval Office, and it is because of them that this book has probably been read by far more people than its austere prose would predict。 This surprising convergence of two worlds has surprised many, myself included, and besides for noting it I won't add to this already long review。PS I first came across Foucault's Collége de France lectures on neoliberal history when I was researching Walter Lippmann's ideas on democracy and public understanding。 Despite (because of?) being a journalist, Lippmann was skeptical about the public's understanding of complex issues, and debated John Dewey on the topic。 Dewey advocated expanded citizen journalism, while Lippmann leaned towards technocracy, a view shared by Schumpeter in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy。 The idea of the law as a methodical, slow process which serves as a buffer against the democratic winds of populism, is related, and informs a good deal of why I strongly disagree with Slobodian's politics。。。PPS Historian Patrick Iber's review in the New Republic is misled by this book in the same way I was, so I want to clarify。 The term "neoliberal" has been criticised (even on the left, as Iber discusses) as signifying basically "all the people I dislike", and rarely a self-appellation。 In theory Slobodian restores rigour to the term by focusing on the ideology of those who explicitly call themselves neoliberals。 But in fact Slobodian also uses the term for "people he dislikes" (such as Milton Friedman, otherwise completely outside this book's purview)。 In fact despite the title, the book makes clear that it is only about a narrow corner of neoliberal history。 So this is not really a definition of "neoliberalism" as currently used - even by the author。 。。。more

R。J。 Gilmour

A fascinating look at neoliberalism。 Slobodian places the ideology and practice in a larger historical context tracing it back to a group of Geneva theorists pre-1947。 He argues that previous interpretations which place the birth of the ideology with the Mont Pelerin Society are too late and that it is necessary to trace the ideas back to the death of the Austro-Hungarian empire at the beginning of the 20th-century。 "U。S。 Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan put the point most bluntly in 2007 A fascinating look at neoliberalism。 Slobodian places the ideology and practice in a larger historical context tracing it back to a group of Geneva theorists pre-1947。 He argues that previous interpretations which place the birth of the ideology with the Mont Pelerin Society are too late and that it is necessary to trace the ideas back to the death of the Austro-Hungarian empire at the beginning of the 20th-century。 "U。S。 Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan put the point most bluntly in 2007 when he declared, "It hardly makes any difference who will be the next president。 The world is governed by market forces。" To its critics, this looked like a new empire with "globalization substitution for colonialism," it was a world in which goods and capital, if not people, flowed according to the logic of supply and demand, creating prosperity-or at least opportunity-for all。 This philosophy of they rule of market forces was labeled 'neoliberalism' by its critics。" 1-2"Historians had focused, in particular, on the Mont Pelerin Society; formed by F。A。 Hayek and others in 1947, as a group of like-minded intellectuals and policy makers who would meet periodically to discuss world affairs and the contemporary condition of the political cause to which they were devoted。。。The clearest-eyed academic observations of the neoliberal philosophy of global ordering have been not historians but social scientists。" 4"I locate a key point of origin of neoliberal globalist thinking within the epochal shift of order that occurred at the end of empire。 Decolonization, I argue, was central to the emergence of the neoliberal model of world governance。" 5"Geneva School neoliberals reconciled the tension between the world economy and the world of nations through their own distinct geography。 Their global imaginary was sketched by the erstwhile Nazi jurist Carl Schmitt in 1950。 Schmitt proposed that there was not one world but two。 One was the world portioned into bounded, territorial states where governments rules over human beings。 This he called the world of imperium, using the Roman legal term。 The other was the world of property, where people owned things, money, and land scattered across the earth。 This was the world of dominium。 The doubled world of modern capitalism coalesced in the nineteenth century。" 10"Geneva School neoliberals offered a blueprint for globalism base don institutions of multilayered governance that are insulated from democratic decision making and charged with maintaining the balance between the political world of imperium and the economic world of dominium。 Dominium is not a space of laissez-faire or noninterventionism but is instead an object of constant maintenance, litigation, design and care。"12"The dominant emotion felt by the neoliberals at the heart of my narrative was not hubris but anxiety。 They expended all their efforts in attempting to design fixes to stabilize what they saw as a precarious arrangement。" 19"This means leaving out the all-important question of finance, which was perhaps the single most important transformation in global capitalism since the 1970s。" 24"One of the major ruptures in the neoliberal narrative of the twentieth century was the First World War。 Scholars have observed that in the course of that war, all belligerent powers "moved in the direction of organized capitalism and war collectivism。" 28"To the group that would become the neoliberals, the era aft 1918 was marked by an attempt to reestablish what they say as the correct balance between the public world of government and the private world of property and contract。 Concretely, this translated into a series of projects of capitalist internationalism。 There needed to be a respect for private property that trumped international law。 Investment must be able to cross borders back and forth without fear of obstacles or expropriation。 Capital needed to become cosmopolitan again。" 29"One challenge for the institutions was to restore free trade; the other was the domestic obstacle of labor unions。" 30"In a telling phrase from 1922, he [Mises] called the state "a producer of security。" 33"One could argue that the "end of the liberal era"-as the advent of a new paradigm of militarized liberalism, later to be called neoliberalism-developed precisely as a response to the growth of mass democracy。 This new paradigm was centred, not in the parliament of university, but in the triumvirate of security, finance。。。A well-armed state and sound money flanked by business were the icons of the ideology taking shape。" 34"The workers themselves were neutral containers of the attribute of labor, as capable of relocation as a chunk of investment capital or a carriage-load of coal。" 50"As the gold standard dissolved, the empire principle, which had suffered a blow after the end of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires, revived as the European powers relied on their colonies and commonwealths for raw materials traded behind tariff walls in imperial blocks。 To the liberal viewer, the world of the 1930s was in segments。" 56"Neoliberalism was born out of projects of world observation, global statistics gathering, and international investigations of the business cycle。" 57-58"In Europe, neoliberalism emerged in the 1930s less as an economic project than as project of politics and law。 The search was on for models of governance, at scales from the local to the global, that would best encase and protect the space of the world economy。" 92"He [Bonn] observed that the Great War had played midwife to two world historical processes。 The first was the end of empire, the second was planning。 He saw 'modern planning' born in the war, when 'scarcity of commodities and shortage of man power led to an attempt at substituting central state control over production and consumption for consumers' sovereignty。'" 96"Wartime expediency became peacetime expectation after 1918。 The guiding hand of the state in economic affairs became the new normal in both capitalist and socialist states。 Varieties of corporatism proliferated。" 98"The goal of federation was to break the link between political citizenship and economic ownership。" 102"The social democratic state was only in utero in the 1930s。 It is striking to see neoliberals already devising a scheme to counter it。 In their version of federation, the discipline of the world economy would undermine planning and confine the nation-state to the field of the political。" 104"Capitalist society, he said, in an analogy he would use throughout this life, was a 'consumer's democracy。。。in which every penny represents a ballot paper。'" 108"Created in 1944 along with the World Bank, the IMF helped ensure relatively stable exchange rates and the possibility of converting money from one currency to another。 The GATT, signed in 1947, worked toward the free-trade vision and, in the words of the agreement, the 'reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international commerce。" 119"Against Roosevelt's Four Freedoms-of speech, of worship, from fear, from want-neoliberals posed the four freedoms of capital, goods, services and labor。" 136"Scholars have shown that business conservatives who organized against the New Deal in the 1930s entered a more public phase of their campaign after Eisenhower's reelection and his embrace of Keynesianism in 1958 under the moniker of 'modern Republicanism。'" 161"By the early 1980s this manifested in renewed attention to modes of investment protection and third-party arbitration alongside the rethinking of criteria for World Bank aid and IMF assistance that would become known as the Washington Consensus。 Equally important was the rise of monetarism, culminating in the so-called Volcker Shock in 1979, which dramatically raised U。S。 interest rates-and thus debt service payments for Global South nations-initiating the Third World debt crisis and dealing the 'death blow to the NIEO movement。'" 222"Cybernetics has its origin in the military research of self-regulating systems during the Second World War, specifically the design of anti-aircraft guys with so-called servomechanisms that could follow a target without human guidance。" 226"In 1971 the Bretton Woods system had ended in its original form when the United States unilaterally ceased exchanging dollars for gold。 In 1973, by responding in part to the diligent persuasion of Haberler and other neoliberals, the States let the dollar 'float,' allowing market demand (alongside targeted state interventions) to dictate its value。" 241"Scholars have given various names to the neoliberal fix。 One calls it the 'constitutional protection of capitalism。' 266"Other scholars have described the creation of an 'offshore world' of tax havens through which nations compete to offer the least possible corporate tax, the greatest possible secrecy, and the best incentives for individuals and corporations to flee the clutches of their own redistributive states。" 267 。。。more

James Watson

This review has been hidden because it contains spoilers。 To view it, click here。 Slobodian provides an exceptional account of the history and development of neo-liberalism in the Western world, and the challenges faced by its supporters such as nationalism, socialism and economic protectionism。 Anyone with an interest in modern economic history; the development and effects of the EEC, GATT, and WTO on global trade; the challenges of balancing democratic participation and national sovereignty with the complete and infallible right to freedom of capital; and much, much more。 B Slobodian provides an exceptional account of the history and development of neo-liberalism in the Western world, and the challenges faced by its supporters such as nationalism, socialism and economic protectionism。 Anyone with an interest in modern economic history; the development and effects of the EEC, GATT, and WTO on global trade; the challenges of balancing democratic participation and national sovereignty with the complete and infallible right to freedom of capital; and much, much more。 By far the most enlightening book on economics I have read thus far。 。。。more

Brock

I got tired of hearing the word “neoliberal” thrown around and not know what it meant so I read this。 Now I kind of get it

Yannick M

This will probably change the way you look at neoliberalism。 Just don't expect a complete history of neoliberalism, especially not its implementation on the national level。 This will probably change the way you look at neoliberalism。 Just don't expect a complete history of neoliberalism, especially not its implementation on the national level。 。。。more

Warren

A tour de force。

Matthew Rohn

A good history of internationalist neoliberalism (or ordoglobalism) but gets somewhat stuck in the "six men and their thoughts" form of intellectual history while neglecting a lot of the politics around these attempts to reorder to world economic system A good history of internationalist neoliberalism (or ordoglobalism) but gets somewhat stuck in the "six men and their thoughts" form of intellectual history while neglecting a lot of the politics around these attempts to reorder to world economic system 。。。more

Joe

A look at the Austrian economists I didn't know existed: the statists and globalists, attempting to insulate an abstract economy from the realm of localized politics。 Much of the philosophy of the Austrians seems like a modernist project, not to organize society for the "common good", but to organize the world economy to elucidate the price mechanism。 A look at the Austrian economists I didn't know existed: the statists and globalists, attempting to insulate an abstract economy from the realm of localized politics。 Much of the philosophy of the Austrians seems like a modernist project, not to organize society for the "common good", but to organize the world economy to elucidate the price mechanism。 。。。more

David Mihalyi

An interesting take on Austrian and Geneva school economists。 While the author is very critical of their legacy, he brings much more nuance to the depiction of their aims and motivations, then the usual charicatured portrayal of 'neoliberal' economists in other critical writing。I think the juxtaposition of their anti-statist national agenda with their aims to establish an international order is very important and often underappreciated。But I think the author underplays how much of their radical An interesting take on Austrian and Geneva school economists。 While the author is very critical of their legacy, he brings much more nuance to the depiction of their aims and motivations, then the usual charicatured portrayal of 'neoliberal' economists in other critical writing。I think the juxtaposition of their anti-statist national agenda with their aims to establish an international order is very important and often underappreciated。But I think the author underplays how much of their radical vision was a stark response to socialism and fascism they saw from close。 。。。more

Nathan

This was a very interesting look of the evolution of the Geneva school of neoliberalism and the guiding philosophy of the early libertarianism of Von Mises and Hayek, detailing important forces in their thought not often discussed in libertarian histories and biography。 It took as it’s framing the rise of neoliberalism and ordoliberalism as a response to the loss of colonialism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and shows how the arguments of this group arose in relationship to the enfor This was a very interesting look of the evolution of the Geneva school of neoliberalism and the guiding philosophy of the early libertarianism of Von Mises and Hayek, detailing important forces in their thought not often discussed in libertarian histories and biography。 It took as it’s framing the rise of neoliberalism and ordoliberalism as a response to the loss of colonialism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and shows how the arguments of this group arose in relationship to the enforcement of economical hierarchy through the advancement of the goal of free movement of capital across borders。I had only begun to see this relationship with colonialism very recently in my study of abusive economic structures and the institutionalization of market power, and had almost no awareness of much of the history in this book despite having what, I thought, was a pretty good biographical sense of several of the main players。Quinn’s analysis has a sophistication that is rare in these kinds of works - he has clear understanding of the history of economical thought outside those he is discussing and is able to “look in from the outside” as well as build the inner dialogues of theory, and his framing in terms of Imperium and Dominium and the attempted “federalisation” of these in political theory helped really provide insightful basis for his the neoliberal arc and many of the other actors along the way (Röpke, Stiglitz, 。。。)。 He was able to give meaning to many of the antidemocratic turns of neoliberalism and the otherwise strange alignment with figures like Pinochet。The only things I had wished might have been covered better was the historical play with neoconservativism in the political ambitions of democratic countries (because I think there have been some important dynamics there with some of the players of neoliberalism and their courting of the far-right in election dynamics that further the Dominium under the false choice), and the need for a bit deeper dive into the use of client-state economic systems as a persistence to colonialism。 These are actually related requests which my current understanding of the history and players has significant overlap with this book and are an important part of the dynamics explored。 However, I understand that the Geneva school of neoliberalism were not always primary players here, and perhaps that is a topic to explore in other books。 The author’s scholarly view, though, leaves one wanting to ask more questions on his understanding。 。。。more